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Fairness in intellectual property valuation and value-sharing:
Towards fair pricing in technology trade  
and licensing
By Ove Granstrand, Marcus Holgersson & Andreas Opedal
ABSTRACT 
In today’s complex and digital business landscape, 
innovation is typically not an effort of a lonely genius 
or an activity confined to a single corporate R&D lab. 
Instead, the innovation process often involves open 
innovation, technology trade, and intellectual pro-
perty (IP) licensing between multiple firms in what is 
sometimes referred to as an innovation ecosystem. 
While this interaction is conducive to value creation, 
it also creates a pressing need for better methods 
and principles for fairly capturing and sharing value 
among contributors. The purpose of this paper is to 
shed light on the plurality and specificity of fairness 
principles, how they appear in IP negotiation experi-
ments with 105 participants, and what outcomes 
they generate compared to competitive behavior. 
The paper especially highlights how investments 
and the structure of innovation actors, artifacts 
(such as patents), and activities impact fairness.1 
1.  INTRODUCTION
Competitive behavior in some form is prevalent among all 
living creatures while fair or just behavior in some sense is 
a social construction primarily among humans. Compe- 
titive behavior is a key subject in economics while fair 
behavior and justice is a key subject in law. This is not to 
suggest that legal studies are more human-focused than 
economic studies, but nevertheless fair behavior does not 
feature as prominently as competitive behavior in econo-
mics, beyond connections between the two such as fair 
competition. At the same time competition does not fea-
ture centrally in legal studies except for competition law. 
These disciplinary biases in studies of human behavior 
suggest that competitive behavior and fair behavior are 
fertile candidates for interdisciplinary studies in law and 
economics.
 One area where there is a central connection between 
competitiveness and fairness, as well as between econo-
mics and law, is that of intellectual property (IP) licensing 
and technology trade, and the related IP contracting and 
pricing. In this area, the value of IP is shared between 
actors through some price mechanism. In commodity 
markets, sellers are price-takers subject to competition 
pushing prices down towards marginal costs. IP markets, 
in contrast, are characterized by uniqueness of the traded 
asset and by complementarities between the traded IP 
and other assets.2 They are also characterized by low liqui-
dity, low transparency, information asymmetries, inter-
mediation, and two-sidedness (with both buyers and 
sellers having preferences about each other), typically in-
volving a relatively low number of potential buyers and 
sellers with unique assets, which can only be valued in 
connection to their complementary and substitute as-
sets.3 Consequently, pricing, or in other words value-sha-
ring, becomes a costly and time-consuming negotiation 
effort, implying considerable transaction costs. 
 In the current era of digitalization, which is the focus of 
this journal issue, technologies are becoming increasingly 
complex, being developed and controlled by numerous 
actors who collaborate and compete with complementary 
and substitute assets in innovation ecosystems4 involving 
various forms of open innovation.5 This, in turn, leads to 
an increasing number of costly transactions of technology 
and IP.6 However, research on innovation ecosystems has 
primarily been occupied with the potential for collabora-
tive value creation in innovation ecosystems7, leaving a 
pressing need to better understand how this value could 
and should be shared among, or fairly captured by, eco-
system actors.8
 A parallel trend enabled by digitalization is that of 
smart and automated contracting,9 which has the poten-
tial to offset the increasing transaction costs mentioned 
above. Some progress has been made in order to standar-
dize and automate contracting, but much remains to be 
done.10 For example, there is a need to match automated 
contract clauses with automated contract prices. Whether 
it is automated or not, price-setting (including royalty- 
setting) can be helped by establishing and using a set of 
ex ante agreed upon fairness principles. This kind of axio-
matic pricing or “smart pricing” can, at least partly, replace 
negotiation and thereby decrease transaction costs.11
 The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the plurality 
and specificity of fairness principles, how they appear in 
negotiation experiments, and what outcomes they gene-
rate compared to competitive behavior. These fairness 
principles are of relevance to law in general and to tech-
nology trade and IP licensing in particular—not least in 
complex innovation ecosystems. 
 The paper will start with a theoretical and conceptual 
discussion of a number of fairness principles. This is 
followed by illustrative examples of the differences in out-
comes from these and other principles depending on the 
structure of actors, artifacts, and activities, or in other 
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terms depending on the structure of the innovation eco-
system.12 To complement these theoretical principles, the 
paper then presents empirical results from negotiations 
in an experimental setting focused on bargaining and 
fairness of simple IP deals, before finally drawing some 
conclusions.
 As to limitations of this paper, no review of the vast sub-
ject of notions and principles of fairness and distributive 
justice is attempted, nor of problems and methods of ex-
perimental economics. The approach in this paper is 
mainly qualitative and informal although the theoretical 
underpinnings are possible to formalize and model quan-
titatively. Moreover, there are both opportunities and 
challenges with the practical use of fairness principles. 
One such major challenge is that of incomplete informa-
tion and information asymmetries across actors. In no 
way should this paper be seen as an attempt to downplay 
such practical challenges, but rather as a small step 
towards contributing to the theoretical principles leading 
the way to more practical use.
2.  SOME PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS  
OF FAIRNESS
It is fair to say that fairness has a fair deal of connotations. 
No universal definitional element is apparent, nor is there 
any universally accepted notion of fairness or unfairness 
across jurisdictions and cultures. However, a common, if 
not dominant, notion rests on an egalitarian principle of 
equity or equality or equal treatment and equal sharing of 
something across players in a fair game with rules that are 
reasonable and do not discriminate against any of the 
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players. Such a principle may be sufficient for acceptance 
of fairness but it might not be necessary, as the popularity 
of playing roulette against the odds indicates. Equality in 
sharing might on the other hand be necessary but not suf-
ficient as the problems with equality in cake cutting or pie 
sharing among several (more than three) kids indicate 
due to procedural uncertainties, envy, and disputes. As to 
serious games in bargaining about IP rights, a serious search 
for applicable and acceptable fairness principles is war-
ranted to reduce transaction costs (apart from being war-
ranted on moral grounds or on pure utilitarian grounds).
 The search for acceptable fairness principles in general 
can be guided by stipulating a set of desirable properties 
they ideally should have, such as being:
• Egalitarian or equitable in the sense that something is 
equalized across some relevant entities like individuals 
or groups of them and there is no discrimination
• Efficient in the sense that the outcomes are Pareto- 
optimal (i.e. there is no other outcome that is at least 
as good for all and better for some)
• Envy-free in the sense that nobody thinks someone 
else is better off (and if so willing to trade)
• Guilt-free in the sense that nobody feels guilty about 
the outcome
• Robust against manipulation, strategic gaming, and 
misrepresentation
• Transparent
The ideal fairness principle does not exist, however, so 
choices and trade-offs between these desirable properties 
have to be made, typically between equity and efficiency.
 An egalitarian principle in itself is moreover far from 
unproblematic. Apart from the basic problems of concep-
tualizing equality or equity and compromising between 
equity and efficiency, problems arise regarding, for ex-
ample, who, what, when and how to equalize—i.e., pro-
blems in answering the questions:
• Who are the subjects or actors to be equalized?
- Individuals, teams, or organizations?
- Owners, producers, users, or third parties?
• What objects, resources, artifacts, or outcomes 
are to be equalized?
- Levels of or changes in gross or net absolute or relative 
returns, profits, costs, or terminal wealth?
- Some other measure of value, expected value, or 
discounted value?
- Some other entity altogether, like a piece of cake or a 
piece of background or foreground knowledge or 
access to opportunities?
• Which activities are carried out in order to equalize? 
- Sharing, allocating, redistributing, repaying, encum-
bering, transferring values or valuables?
• When is equality in treatment and/or outcomes 
to be established?
- Ex ante or ex post in the short or long term?
• How is fairness to be established and by whom?
- By yardsticks, rules, or cultural norms applied by 
participants, third parties, or some judicial institution?
Answers to these (mostly old philosophical) questions 
generate a number of fairness principles, or, alternatively, 
means to reduce some measure of unfairness, in some cases 
related to principles of justice, e.g.:
• A proportionality principle
- As when awarded IP damages are proportional to the 
number of infringed and valid patents (without 
concern about their structural importance)
• A probabilistic principle
- As when players are given an equal chance to  
something or an equal expected value or utility of 
something (without concern for envy ex post)
• A reciprocity principle
- As expressed by Jesus: “whatever you desire for men to 
do to you, you shall also do to them”13 (without con-
cern for differing preferences or values among people)
• A Marxian principle for distributive justice
- As expressed by Marx: ”from each according to his 
ability, to each according to his need”14 
• A Rawlsian principle for distributive justice
- As when conditionally providing most to those with the 
dearest need plus providing equal opportunity to all15
These examples are listed here in order to contextualize 
the following discussion rather than to attempt a brief 
review of the rich literature from ancient times onwards 
on various notions of fairness, justice, equality, right, reason, 
etc. As these notions are deeply embedded in our cul- 
ture(s) they tend to enter into negotiations, often impli-
citly, which calls for some explication. This is so especially 
when axiomatic bargaining approaches are sought for, 
i.e., principles that bargaining parties can make binding 
commitments to ex ante, e.g., in form of fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory (FRAND) commitments in royalty- 
setting of IP licenses.
 This paper focuses on egalitarian fairness principles 
involving some form of proportionality or reciprocity. 
Such principles in a bargaining context could simply be 
classified as cost-based, value-based, or investment-based, 
depending upon what is being shared and equalized. 
 From an investment point of view, equalizing the rates 
of return (on investment) could be motivated as fair and 
reasonable since capital constrained investors tend to 
rank their indivisible investment opportunities according 
to rate of return rather than according to absolute returns 
from investments. Thus, this would ensure fair rates of 
return (FROR) in relative terms. This approach has been 
proposed for FRAND-based royalty-setting for indepen-
dent assets in form of non-exclusive patent licenses with 
additive returns and investments among the licen- 
sees.16 On the other hand if the investments have already 
been made with sunk costs and the corresponding assets 
are pooled ex post as complementary assets in a joint 
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collaborative project with economies of scope it might 
be considered a more fair approach to equalize absolute 
returns, since bygones are bygones. Thus, this would 
ensure fair returns (FR) in absolute terms.
 Finally, as to limitations of these two fairness principles, 
one may observe that neither of them provides portfolio 
value shares that are preserved under aggregation and 
disaggregation of assets or asset-holding players. This is 
most easily seen from considering the example with two 
asset holders, each with one left shoe, and a third asset 
holder with one right shoe. The left shoe holders could 
pool their assets and then capture half of the portfolio 
value as their fair share jointly and then split this half equ-
ally among themselves, thereby each getting a quarter.
 In case of patents instead of shoes, this example could 
be reformulated to correspond to the situation when two 
strongly complementary patents A and B are held separa-
tely and a third party holds a strong substitute patent C to B. 
Note that C as well as B are complements to A, see Figure 1.
13 Matthew 7:12, The World English Bible.
14 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program 
(1875).
15 John Rawls, "A Theory of Justice",  (1971).
16 Ove Granstrand and Marcus Holgersson, 
"The 25% Rule Revisited and a New 
Investment-Based Method for Determining 
Frand Licensing Royalties", LES Nouvelles 
25 (2012).
17 The Shapley value is a general egalitarian 
method for valuation of contributions from 
players in a cooperative game or contribu-
tions from assets in a portfolio without any 
concern about the initial wealth of the 
players. The method is based on reciprocity 
in the sense that the marginal value any 
player contributes to any other player's 
share of any coalition's value in a cooperative 
game is bilaterally equalized. The fair value 
of any player then turns out in a somewhat 
surprising and counterintuitive way to 
become a weighted sum of that player's 
marginal value added to each conceivable 
coalition in the game with the weights being 
the average over all coalition sizes of the 
average marginal value added by that player 
to each coalition of a certain size. This is 
more easily grasped by a formula; see, e.g., 
Kevin Leyton-Brown and Yoav Shoham, 
"Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise 
Multidisciplinary Introduction", Synthesis 
lectures on artificial intelligence and 
machine learning 2, no. 1 (2008). For further 
applications of the Shapley value in patent 
portfolio valuations, see Ove Granstrand,  
"Valuation and Value Sharing of Structured 
Portfolios with Complementary and 
Substitute Assets", CIM Working Paper 
2014:1, Chalmers University of Technology 
(2014).
18 Formally The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel.
19 This is also discussed by Coase in the 
classical case of an upstream factory 
polluting water for a downstream laundry. 
This is generally considered unfair to the 
laundry but would it be unfair if the factory 
was first established and then the laundry 
was located downstream despite knowledge 
about the pollution? In general there is a 
presumption of a first mover advantage in 
rights allocation. See Ronald H. Coase, "The 
Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law and 
Economics 3, no. Oct. (1960).
Now suppose B is invented in R&D stage I and then B is 
invented around by C at a subsequent R&D stage II. Essen- 
tiality of B now is lost. Then the previous fair 50/50 split 
between A and B is no longer fair considering the portfolio 
{A, B, C}. If instead applying the so called Shapley value17, 
introduced in 1951 by Lloyd Shapley who later received the 
Nobel Prize18, the value shares of A, B, and C in stage II are 
2/3, 1/6, and 1/6. This is also a type of coalitional outcome. 
Here, the value is split in accordance of each patent’s 
weighted average marginal contribution to the coalition. 
It is not clear that this split would be considered fair and 
reasonable to the B-holder, who then would have no in-
centive to allow the C-holder to enter into any collabora-
tion, while the A-holder has a strong incentive to do so. 
Thus, a Shapley-based fairness principle could produce 
non-Pareto changes in the value sharing of a dynamically 
changing asset portfolio, in which new pure substitute 
patents are included. At the same time it could be argued 
on other fairness grounds that the new entrant, i.e., the 
C-holder, does not add total value to the portfolio, just 
redistributes the Shapley value, and thus should not 
receive any value. One could also argue that the B- and 
C-holder could form a coalition, pool their substitute 
assets and claim a fair share for their coalition, and then 
split that share equally. The A-holder, on the other hand, 
has a strong incentive to abandon a fair sharing regardless 
of any fairness principle, since pure competitive bargai-
ning could allow the A-holder to appropriate almost the 
total value. 
 This illustrates a number of things:
• There are several equally justifiable fairness principles 
among which a choice has to be made
• Complementary as well as substitute assets matter for 
appropriation and sharing of value
• What is fair and reasonable may depend upon how 
the assets are created over time19 
• Fairness could be exercised among assets, among 
partitions (modules) of assets and among actors with 
differing outcomes
• Fairness could be exercised sequentially
The next section further elaborates on this with numerical 
examples as illustration, and then also considers how in-
vestments may affect fair sharing and pricing.
Figure 1 Patent A with complement patents B and C, which in turn are 
substitutes to each other.
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3.  ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF SIMPLE 
FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES AND BARGAINING 
SITUATIONS
To illustrate the conceptual discussion above and the 
potential outcomes of different fairness principles a couple 
of simple numerical examples will be introduced. First 
assume two patents, A and B, owned by two different 
firms. A is worth 50 alone, while B is worthless on its own. 
Jointly, however, the two patents are worth 100. What is 
then a fair split of the joint 100 between the A-holder and 
the B-holder? According to experience from discussing 
these issues with practitioners and students over several 
years, there is close to a consensus that a fair split of the 
100 would be 75 to the A-holder and 25 to the B-holder. 
The argument typically brought forward is that the indivi-
dual value of A (50) should be kept by the A-holder, while 
the added value of combining A and B (another 50) should 
be distributed equally (25 each) between the A-holder 
and B-holder since they contribute equally.
 By adding a third patent, C, and a third actor, the C-holder, 
things are made more complicated. Now assume that A, 
B, and C are all worth zero on their own. The combina-
tions {A, B}, {A, C}, {A, B, C} are all equally valuable, being 
jointly worth 100 (see Figure 1). This means that B and C 
are substitutes while they are both complementary to A, 
in line with the discussion in the previous section. While 
this is still a relatively simple example, there no longer is 
consensus what a fair split of the value of 100 between A, 
B, and C is. One way of arguing is that since there is com-
petition between the B-holder and the C-holder, the 
A-holder has the opportunity to play one off against the 
other and reap very close to all of the value while the 
others would not receive anything or hardly anything. 
Another way of arguing is that the B-holder and the 
C-holder can form a coalition through which they would 
reach the same bargaining power as the A-holder. Then A 
would be valued at 50 and the portfolio of B and C would 
be valued at 50, which would then be split up equally (25 
each) between B and C. This is the structural proportio-
nality principle. A third way of arguing is that whenever it 
is decided which one of the two patents B or C is used in 
conjunction with A, that one is equally important as A, 
and they should therefore be valued equally (50 each). 
This is the selective proportionality principle.20 A fourth 
way of arguing, here called pure proportionality, is a 
variant of the previous, but instead of assuming a patent 
selection among substitutes it assumes equal value of all 
20 In practice and court cases this is sometimes 
referred to as the top-down approach of 
royalty calculation.
21 The same investment levels for B and C are 
used here for simplicity, but the principles are 
applicable also with individual differences in 
investments.
22 If the A-holder contracts with the B-holder, 
the selective proportionality principle would, 
when accounting for investments, say that the 
A-holder and B-holder should share their joint 
net value of 100 – 30 – 10 = 60 equally. Thus, 
A-holder would receive 30 + 30 = 60 and 
B-holder would receive 10 + 30 = 40, giving 
them the same net values (30 each). In 
contrast, the pure proportionality principle 
would give an equal share of the surplus (50 / 
3 = 17) to all three patent holders, in addition 
to their respective investments. The Shapley 
principle would instead distribute the net 
value by giving 2/3 of the surplus to the 
A-holder and 1/3 each to the B-holder and 
C-holder.
Table 1. Illustrative outcomes from different fairness principles compared 
to competitive bargaining (with rounded numbers).
   A B C Total
Competitive bargaining 100-ɛ ɛ or 0 0 or ɛ 100
Structural proportionality 50 25 25 100
Selective proportionality 50 50 or 0 0 or 50 100
Pure proportionality 33 33 33 100
Shapley value 67 17 17 100
complementary and substitute patents (in this case 33 
each). A fifth way of arguing is to calculate the Shapley 
value, as briefly introduced above, leading to A being 
valued at 67 and B and C each at 17. The outcomes 
of these different fairness principles are summarized in 
Table 1. 
 The example above can also illustrate how the structure 
of actors, technological artifacts (inventions, patents, 
etc.), and activities in an innovation ecosystem impact 
the perception of fairness. First, consider actor structure, 
and compare the standard situation introduced above in 
Figure 1 with a situation where patent A and B are owned 
by Owner 1 while C is owned by Owner 2, see Figure 2a. 
Since Owner 1 holds both of the two necessary comple-
ments, i.e., the complete technology, while Owner 2 just 
holds an incomplete technology, with zero value on its 
own, most would argue that it is not fair that Owner 1 
should share any value with Owner 2, and that Owner 1’s 
two patents therefore are equally valuable. This is in line 
with the selective proportionality principle, see Table 1. 
Second, consider artifact structure. By focusing on sym-
metries among artifacts one outcome is that patents B 
and C are together equally important and valuable as 
patent A, and that B is equally important and valuable as 
C, see Figure 2b. This is the structural proportionality 
principle. An alternative is to calculate the weighted aver-
age marginal contributions in line with the Shapley value. 
With the Shapley principle B and C are also equally valu-
able, but with a lower joint value than A. Third, consider 
activity structure, and more specifically the order in which 
the assets or artifacts are created. Assume that patent A 
and B are invented in stage I and patent C in stage II, see 
Figure 2c. There is then a first mover claim to fairness in 
the sense that who is first to invent has arguably a larger 
fair claim than who is second with an invent-around sub-
stitute patent, and the selective proportionality principle 
could again be applied. 
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In addition to the complication of a third patent as discussed 
above, the investments behind each of the three patents 
can now be introduced to complicate matters further. As-
sume that the A-holder has spent 30 on developing A and 
the holders of B, and C have spent 10 each on their 
patents.21 This means that the net value or surplus of the 
three patents is 100 – 30 – 10 – 10 = 50. The same relations-
hips apply, meaning that each patent is worthless alone 
but A together with B and/or C have a gross value of 100. 
Fairness can now be argued on the basis of absolute values 
(some form of fair returns) or relative values (some form 
of fair rates of returns) when accounting for investments.
 For principles based on absolute values, emphasizing 
fair returns, the actors involved in collaboration are first 
reimbursed for their investments, and the surplus value is 
subsequently shared in line with the different principles 
introduced above. For example, in line with structural 
proportionality of surplus, the (explicit or implicit) coali-
tion between the B-holder and the C-holder receives 
reimbursement for its investments (10 + 10 = 20) plus half 
of the surplus (50 / 2 = 25), meaning a total gross value of 
45, which is shared between the B-holder and the C-holder. 
Analogously, the A-holder receives reimbursement of its 
investment (30) plus half of the surplus (25), meaning a 
total gross value of 55. The selective proportionality, pure 
proportionality, and Shapley principles follow the same 
logic of being applied to the surplus rather than gross 
value, see Table 2.22 Figure 2 Three patents and the related actor, artifact, and activity 
structures.
Table 2 Illustrative outcomes from different fairness principles when accounting for investments (with rounded numbers)
A B C Total
Amount of investment 30 10 10 50
Principles based on absolute values / fair returns (FR):
Structural proportionality of surplus
     gross value 55 23 23 100
     net value 25 13 13 50
Selective proportionality of surplus
     gross value 60 40 or 0 0 or 40 100
     net value 30 30 or -10 -10 or 30 50
Pure proportionality of surplus
     gross value 47 27 27 100
     net value 17 17 17 50
Shapley distribution of surplus
     gross value 63 18 18 100
     net value 33 8 8 50
Principles based on relative values / Fair rates of returns (FROR):
Selective fair rate of return (FROR)
     gross value 75 25 or 0 0 or 25 100
     net value 45 15 or -10 -10 or 15 50
Structural FROR
     gross value 60 20 20 100
     net value 30 10 10 50
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However, another way to argue in case of bilateral con-
tracting or various coalitions is that since the A-holder 
invested more it makes sense that A should be assigned a 
higher share of the net value. Such principles would be 
based on relative values, and they follow the logic of sha-
ring profits or dividends across investors or shareholders. 
The more you have invested, the more you should receive. 
Applying this logic in case of a bilateral contract involving 
A and B, it would be fair if A and B are assigned values 
leading to equal rates of returns, as discussed above.23 If 
the A-holder receives 75, the rate of return is (75 – 30) / 30 
= 150%, which leaves 25 to B-holder, also giving a rate of 
return (25 – 10) / 10 = 150%. If instead the B-holder and 
C-holder form a coalition that contracts with the A-hol-
der, one fairness principle is that the coalition’s rate of 
return should be the same as the A-holder’s rate of 
return. This would lead to the final value distribution in 
Table 2, i.e., 60 to the A-holder and 20 each to the B- and 
C-holder.
4.  AN EXPERIMENT OF BARGAINING AND 
FAIRNESS IN PATENT TRADE
After introducing a number of theoretical fairness prin-
ciples, and illustrating the variation of outcomes they 
produce, results from an experiment of bargaining and 
fairness in patent trade will now be presented to explore 
how individuals bargain and reason about fairness in col-
laborative and competitive situations. In the first section 
below the experimental design is briefly introduced, and 
in the second section the experimental results are presented.
4.1 Experimental design
The experiment was conducted through oTree which is an 
open source platform for behavioral research.24 A cohort 
consisting of 105 university students took part in the ex-
periment as participants in bargaining games. The parti-
cipants were kept physically separated from each other 
and communicated through game-internal chat messages 
on their computers. They were kept anonymous and were 
asked not to reveal their identities in the chat. In order to 
create incentives for the participants to perform well, real 
world prizes of 1000 SEK were given out in a lottery, and 
lottery tickets were awarded to the participants in a 
weighted fashion based on performance. The experiment 
was part of a larger study on the game theoretic aspects of 
intellectual asset negotiations and only the parts relevant 
for this paper are presented here. 
 The first part of the experiment to be presented here 
was a trilateral game which featured three anonymous 
players who were assigned the roles A-holder (buyer), 
B-holder (seller) and C-holder (seller). The A-holder held 
a product patent zero value, the B-holder held a process 
patent B with zero value and the C-holder held a process 
patent C with zero value. The total value of holding both 
the product patent and one of the process patents, i.e., 
either A and B or A and C, was however 100. Thus, A for-
med a complementary relation with B and C respectively, 
while B and C formed a substitute relation with each 
other, i.e., the same structure as in Figure 1 which has 
been introduced conceptually and numerically above. 
 During three rounds, the A-holder negotiated with the 
B-holder and/or the C-holder for the complementary pro-
cess patent. The players communicated by chat to agree 
on a, for all players, non-binding price. At the end of each 
round the buying A-holder was asked to give a take-it-or-
leave-it binding offer to the selling player, which the seller 
could choose to accept or reject. I.e., the end of each 
round was designed as a version of the classical ultima-
tum game. The ultimatum game has many variants but in 
its basic standard form it has one proposer, who proposes 
as a take-it-or-leave-it offer a split of 100 to a responder 
who can accept the offer in which case the split is paid out 
to the players, or reject the offer in which case neither 
player gets anything. Rational players who prefer some- 
thing to nothing without caring about fairness are then 
expected to end up with a 99/1 split. Empirically, however, 
an aversion to unfairness almost always enters into the 
game as well as sometimes a preference for fairness. Thus, 
fairness has an intrinsic value and the responder is willing 
to pay a price for it, depending on a variety of factors, 
according to empirical studies.25 
 In the first round, only the A-holder and the B-holder 
got to negotiate while the C-holder was asked to wait. Simi- 
larly, in the second round the B-holder was instead asked 
to wait while the A-holder and the C-holder got to nego- 
tiate. In the third round the A-holder could negotiate 
with both sellers simultaneously, and could at the end 
of the round choose to give an offer to either one of the 
selling players. For all three rounds, the B-holder and the 
C-holder had no knowledge of each other unless the 
A-holder, who held this as private information, chose to 
reveal it. 
 In an additional round of the trilateral game all three 
players were asked to discuss retrospectively what would 
have been a fair split of the total value of 100. At the end of 
the round, the A-holder would enter the fair value assigned 
to each player and the other players would enter whether 
they agreed with these specified value assignments. The 
intention was here to explore the participants’ sense of 
fairness rather than the bargaining outcome.
 The second part of the experiment was a public goods 
game26 which featured four players in which two were 
given an initial wealth of 100,000 SEK (categorized as 
“poor”) and two were given an initial wealth of 2,000,000 
SEK (categorized as “rich”). All players could choose what 
amount to contribute to a common investment pool, 
which was to be multiplied by 1.6 after which all four 
players shared the final sum in four equally large parts. 
See Figure 3 for an illustration. The players had informa-
tion about whether they were a poor or a rich player, but 
they did not know the initial wealth assigned to the other 
player category. They were asked to maximize their indi- 
vidual terminal wealth, which would be the individual 
share of the return from their joint investment plus the 
share of the individual initial wealth they did not invest.
 Similarly to the trilateral game there was an additional 
round of the public goods game. In this round the players 
discussed what would have been a fair principle to use for 
the distribution of the total returns. 
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23 This approach has been introduced as the 
investment-based method of royalty 
calculation, see Granstrand and Holgersson, 
"The 25% Rule Revisited and a New 
Investment-Based Method for Determining 
Frand Licensing Royalties."; Ove Granstrand, 
"Fair and Reasonable Royalty Rate 
Determination", les Nouvelles 41, no. 3 (2006).
24 For details, see Daniel L. Chen, Martin 
Schonger, and Chris Wickens, "Otree—an 
Open-Source Platform for Laboratory, 
Online, and Field Experiments", Journal of 
Behavioral and Experimental Finance 9 (2016).
25 For example, the price goes up if the 
responder is under the influence of alcohol, 
meaning that alcohol increases the 
unfairness aversion or in other words the 
propensity to become "pissed off" by an 
unfair offer. For more details, see Carey K. 
Morewedge, Tamar Krishnamurti, and Dan 
Ariely, "Focused on Fairness: Alcohol 
Intoxication Increases the Costly Rejection of 
Inequitable Rewards", Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 50 (2014).
26 See J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, eds., The 
handbook of experimental economics 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995).
27 Wilcoxon’s non-parametric test was chosen 
over Student’s t-test as the sample means 
could not confidently be assumed to follow a 
normal distribution and the equal variance 
assumption is seemingly violated. 
Furthermore, the paired two-sample 
signed-rank test was chosen to take 
advantage of the dependent structure 
coming from the same participants playing 
together in all rounds. It came at a cost of 
reduced sample size however, as only data 
points where there was a deal in both rounds 
could be included in the test. This 
consideration resulted in 18 data points 
being included in the first test and 19 data 
points being included in the second test.
4.2 Empirical results from experiment
The results from the three negotiation rounds of the trila-
teral game are presented in Table 3, where the number of 
deals made, the proportion of games where a deal was 
made, as well as the sample mean, sample median, and 
sample standard deviation of the accepted prices are pre-
sented for each round. Player groups with apparent 
misinterpretations of the game or frivolous behavior were 
deemed as outliers and these data points were excluded 
when computing the summary statistics. Four (11%) out 
of the 35 games played in total were excluded for these 
reasons. 
 The data seems to suggest a trend with decreasing prices 
over the number of rounds. To assess whether these diffe-
Figure 3 The public goods game with two rich and two poor players 
investing in a common pool.
Table 3 Results and summary statistics from the trilateral game
# of 
deals
Proportion 
of deals
Sample 
mean
Sample 
median
Sample 
standard 
deviation
Round One 24 0.77 48.5 50 3.7
Round Two 21 0.68 45.4 47 6.2
Round Three 29 0.94 41.1 40 9.1
rences are statistically significant, two-sided Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests were performed for differences between 
round one and two and between round two and three, 
respectively.27 The test of the difference between round 
one and two gave a p-value of 0.0143 and the test of the 
difference between round two and three gave a p-value of 
0.0005. Thus, both of the differences are significant at the 
0.05 significance level, meaning that the data indicates a 
decreasing trend in price over consecutive rounds. This 
decrease is in line with expectations given the competi-
tion on the seller side of the market and the information 
asymmetry in favor of the A-holder, even though the 
absolute numbers are surprisingly high.
 As for the fairness discussion round of the trilateral 
game, there were 23 participant group discussions left to 
analyze after excluding outliers. Out of these, 14 (61%) 
managed to agree upon a fair value distribution. A majo-
rity consisting of nine of the groups that reached an agre-
ement (64%) proposed a 33/33/33 split, corresponding to 
the pure proportionality principle. Two groups (14%) 
agreed to a split of 50/25/25 which corresponds to the 
structural proportionality principle. Another two groups 
(14%) suggested something in between, namely a 
40/30/30 split where the buyer takes a larger share. One 
group with agreement (7%) proposed a 60/0/40 split. 
The A-holder of the groups that did not agree proposed 
the following value distributions: 33/33/33, 50/25/25, 
40/30/30, 50/50/0, 50/0/50 and 60/40/0. These results 
are summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4 Suggested fairness distributions in the trilateral game
Value distribution # of proposals
A-holder B-holder C-holder With 
agreement
Without 
agreement
33 33 33 9 2
50 25 25 2 2
40 30 30 2 1
60 0 40 1 0
60 40 0 0 1
50 50 0 0 2
50 0 50 0 1
Total 14 9
–  14  –
STOCKHOLM INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  LAW REVIEW VOLUME 3 ,  ISSUE  1 ,  JUNE  2020 
The results from the first round of the public goods game 
are presented in Table 5, computed from the 27 games 
that were played. As can be seen in the table, the invest-
ments from rich players are considerably higher than those 
of the poor players. In relative terms however, poor play-
ers made larger contributions to the common pool, indi-
cating a higher relative contribution among the poor, 
albeit with smaller absolute contributions. The relative 
difference is not significant however, according to a 
two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test performed on norma-
lized values with significance level 0.05, which produced 
a p-value of 0.079.28 Furthermore, no significant diffe- 
rences between males and females were found.29
 Of main interest to this article is the fairness discussion 
round of the public goods game, which was focused on 
agreeing upon a fair distribution of the returns from the 
game. The results were summarized by manually analy-
zing and concluding the overall consensus from the chat 
messages. Most participants agreed that splitting the 
return by equal rate of return (or FROR) would be fair. 
Out of all 27 groups, 19 (70%) either agreed fully or had a 
majority suggesting that this would be the fairest way of 
sharing the returns. Four groups suggested or agreed to 
equal absolute returns (more in line with the proportio-
nality principle discussed above). There were additionally 
a number of more creative suggestions, examples being 
receiving the amount invested plus an equal absolute share 
of the profit, FROR given that everyone invests 100,000 
SEK and a split of 45% of returns to the rich players and 
5% of returns to the poor players. All of these were unique 
when compared across groups. 
5.  CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
Trade and transfer of new technologies, data, and infor-
mation is growing fast worldwide, due to increasing tech-
nological complexity and R&D costs, and not the least due 
to new digital technologies, which are facilitating trade and 
transfer processes through lowering transaction costs. At 
the same time digital technologies are traded and trans-
ferred as information products and thus take on dual roles 
in trade and transfer. Transaction costs could also be 
lowered by managerial and legal means for improving 
market search, negotiations, contracting, dispute resolu-
tion (arbitration, mediation, litigation), and by provision 
of a contractual infrastructure such as the IPR system. 
This paper has attempted to argue that employment of 
notions and principles of fairness and fair pricing behavior 
of technology and IP licenses in the spirit of axiomatic 
bargaining is one way to lower transaction costs compared 
to competitive pricing due to the idiosyncrasies of techno-
logy and IP markets. Fairness principles may more- 
over be implemented in automated contracting through 
algorithms, certified as fair analogous to the certification 
of fair trade. The use of fairness principles may also convey 
other benefits such as increased equity but also costs such 
as decreased efficiency. However, fairness is an ambiguous 
concept, witnessed not the least by experiences from 
FRAND licensing in the telecommunications innovation 
ecosystem. The purpose of this paper has been to shed 
light on the plurality and specificity of fairness principles, 
how they appear in negotiation experiments and what 
bargaining outcomes they generate compared to competi-
tive behavior. 
 One contribution of the paper is the highlighting of 
how focusing on actor, artifact, and activity structures, 
respectively, impact fairness. Since these components are 
central components in innovation ecosystems31 the results 
here indicate the close relationship between the archi-
tecture of an innovation ecosystem and the fair value dist-
ribution, or fair value capture, among the ecosystem 
participants. This is a promising avenue for future research, 
not least since research on innovation ecosystems has 
primarily been concerned with value creation.32 
 Another contribution of the paper, more specifically 
from the experiment, is that the employment of some 
amount of fairness in bargaining is quite frequent even in 
Table 5 Results and summary statistics from the public goods game
Poor group (n = 54) Rich group (n = 51)30 
Average size of investment 45,012 614,525
Average size of investment 
as share of initial wealth
0.450 0.307
Median size of investment 50,000 500,000
Median size of investment 
as share of initial wealth
0.5 0.25
Standard deviation of size of 
investment
37,436 587,437
Coefficient of variation for 
size of investment
0.83 0.96
28 A non-parametric Wilcoxon test is once again 
chosen as assumptions regarding normal 
distribution and equal variance cannot be 
made. This time the samples are 
independent however, requiring a rank-sum 
test as opposed to the signed-rank test used 
previously.
29 For more research on inequality and 
contributions to public goods, see Lisa R. 
Anderson, Jennifer M. Mellor, and Jeffrey 
Milyo, "Inequality and Public Good Provision: 
An Experimental Analysis", The Journal of 
Socio-Economics 37, no. 3 (2008).
30 Note the difference in sample size which is 
due to the number of participants not adding 
up to a multiple of 4. 
31 Granstrand and Holgersson, "Innovation Eco-
systems: A Conceptual Review and a New 
Definition."
32 Gomes et al., "Unpacking the Innovation 
Ecosystem Construct: Evolution, Gaps and 
Trends."; Granstrand and Holgersson, 
"Innovation Ecosystems: A Conceptual 
Review and a New Definition."
33 This goes in line with the rich research on 
ultimatum games. See, e.g., Martin A. 
Nowak, Karen M. Page, and Karl Sigmund, 
"Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum 
Game", Science 289, no. 5485 (2000).
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competitive settings.33 When the actors then are instructed 
to strike a fair deal, a number of different fairness principles 
appear with or without concern for the structural impor-
tance of the different patents for sale or the structural 
importance of the different patent rights holders. A sur-
prising finding is the propensity to use the pure propor-
tionality principle even in the experimental setting invol-
ving both complement and substitute patents, i.e., 
disregarding the uniqueness of patent A.
 However, when investment information is provided, a 
majority of participants converge towards fairness prin-
ciples based on relative value, striving towards equal or 
fair rates of return (FROR). The FROR principle in turn 
could be used in at least two ways as illustrated by the 
examples, either through equalizing rate of returns simul-
taneously or sequentially. A sequential or stepwise FROR 
principle first considers coalitions or modules of actors or 
artifacts with similar structural positions, i.e., B and C in 
the examples, and then equalize the rate of return with 
regard to the coalitions' aggregate investments, and, second, 
makes a fair sharing within the coalitions. In other and 
more general words, one first performs an inter-group 
sharing and then an intra-group sharing, possibly using 
different fairness principles as well.
 The Shapley value, that takes structural importance but 
not explicitly investments into account, was never invoked 
in the experiment, possibly due to bounded rationality 
and lack of awareness, but could analytically be used also 
when investments enter the picture as demonstrated con-
ceptually. 
 It is interesting to note how the inclusion of invest-
ments, sacrifices, or efforts more generally apparently 
changes our notions or perceptions of fairness. A practical 
implication of this observation is that one should devise 
principles for output sharing that takes investments, 
efforts, or sacrifices into account in order to incentivize 
input contributions for a common good. On a more gene-
ral level this observation opens up questions for further 
research and philosophical speculation about the role of 
entitlements or endowments in the conception of fairness 
and distributive justice. One can also note that principles 
for fair sharing of value also could apply to fair sharing of 
chores and even in some situations a "fair" or justifiable 
sharing of damages and guilt, such as in a crime committed 
by several actors or a disaster caused by the joint failure 
of several artifacts. Again, many questions for further 
research open up.
 A final conclusion is that the concept of fairness is diffi-
cult even in simple cases like here. This hardly comes as a 
surprise to practitioners and scholars of law, but maybe 
more so to managers and executives of technology-based 
firms and corporations, where there is an increasing strive 
to build and engage in innovation ecosystems and other 
forms of open innovation and collaborative R&D. This 
points to the great potential impact from formulating, 
analyzing, and testing fairness principles. Hopefully, this 
article has not only started to contribute with such prin-
ciples, but also inspired others to participate in the fair 
deal of research on fairness that lies ahead.
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